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INRE EPSTEIN: A CASE OF PATENT HEARSAY
Dennis M. de Guzman
Abstract: In In re Epstein, the Federal Circuit held that the United States Patent and
Trademark Office may rely on hearsay evidence to reject patent applications. This Note
examines the effects of the Epstein decision against the backdrop of software patenting and
how administrative agencies have traditionally approached the problem of evaluating
hearsay. It argues that the Patent and Trademark Office should articulate standards when
scrutinizing hearsay in order to provide guidance to examiners and applicants, to prevent
placing an unfair burden on applicants, and to thwart the abuse of the patent system.
The software patent is perhaps the most sought-after patent today. Its
value in revenue and the potential costs of patent infringement litigation
can be measured in millions of dollars. Because of the dynamic field of
software and its recent eligibility for patentability,1 judicial decisions
relating to software will have profound ramifications on the
high-technology industry and the patent system. The Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit made such a decision on August 17, 1994, when
it held that the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) may
rely on hearsay statements when considering patent applications.2 In In
re Epstein,3 the court upheld the PTO's rejection of an application for a
computerized warehousing system based on hearsay statements from
several sources, including an electronic database. The PTO used hearsay
to support its conclusion that the applicant was not entitled to a patent
because similar systems were in "public use or on sale" more than one
year prior to the application filing date.4
Epstein raises serious questions regarding the process of obtaining
patents for software and other computer-related technology.
Specifically, the decision has broadened the scope of evidence that the
PTO may consider and has eased the standards by which the PTO can
make a prima facie showing that an applicant is not entitled to a patent.
The court has placed the burden on the applicant to disprove PTO
1. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
2. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases
that arise under the patent laws. Its rulings guide the administration of the patent system in the
PTO, in federal district court patent litigation, and in International Trade Commission patent
proceedings. Donald S. Chisum & Michael A. Jacobs, Understanding Intellectual Propery Law
2-17 to 2-18 (1992).
3. 32 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
4. Id. at 1567.
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findings based on hearsay.5 In contrast to other types of patent
applications, the unreliability of hearsay, the rapid evolution of software
technology, and the lack of informational resources may impose an
unfair and difficult burden to software patent applic-ants. The relaxed
admissibility of hearsay also may encourage abuse of the patent system
as competitors try to prevent each other from obtaining lucrative
software patents.
This Note argues that the PTO must scrutinize hearsay before it
rejects software patent applications. Part I examines hearsay and how
administrative agencies have approached its inherent problems, and the
section concludes with a brief summary of the patenting process to help
illustrate the relevance of evidence in the application process. Part II
provides a brief overview of Epstein. Part III analyzes the court's
reasoning in the case and suggests the broader implications of its
holding. Finally, part IV proposes solutions for instances when hearsay
is encountered and evaluated during an examination of a software patent
application.
I. THE RELEVANCE OF HEARSAY IN PATENT LAW
A. The Hearsay Rule andAdministrative Agencies
Hearsay is an oral or written statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered as evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted.6 The exclusionary rule of evidence
that bars hearsay originates in the need to prevent lay jurors from
considering unreliable evidence.7 Also, the exclusion is necessary in
instances where there is no opportunity to cross-examine the person who
made the out-of-court statement.'
There are numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule.' Among them is
the regularly-kept business-record exception.10 Data recorded in business
documents are generally hearsay, but because of the need for accuracy in
the maintenance of records and the regular practice of recording data,
this information is assumed to have a sufficient degree of
5. Id. at 1565-66.
6. Fed. R. Evid. 801.
7. Edward W. Cleary et al., McCormick on Evidence § 350, at 1005 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
McCormick].
8. Id. § 252, at751.
9. Fed. R. Evid. 803.
10. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
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trustworthiness." Thus, courts give many assertions that are technically
hearsay probative value because of their inherent reliability.
The proceedings of administrative agencies, such as the PTO, 2 have
never been subject to the formal rules of evidence for various policy
reasons. First, the rigid rules of evidence would slow down the
administrative process because agencies perform significantly more
adjudications than courts. 3 Also, hearsay rules are meant to insulate the
lay juror from incompetent evidence, a concern that is less relevant
where evidence is evaluated by an experienced administrative official
who is an expert in a particular field and is better able to judge the
quality of evidence. 4 While administrative agencies are excluded from
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 5 they may provide for the use of the
rules of evidence in their proceedings. 6
Because the adjudicative nature of administrative proceedings closely
resembles formal trials, some of the formal rules have been applied. 7
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 8 provides a liberal standard
for the receipt of evidence in that hearsay is admissible, but the evidence
must be reliable and substantial. 9 Some PTO rules resemble the APA
11. McCormick, supra note 7, § 306, at 872.
12. The PTO is an administrative agency under the Department of Commerce. 35 U.S.C. § 1
(1988).
13. Ernest Gellhom, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal Administrative Hearings,
1971 Duke L.J. 1, 5-6; 3 Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 16.1-.3 (2d ed. 1980).
14. McCormick, supra note 7, § 350, at 1005.
15. Fed. P, Evid. 1101.
16. Compare 37 C.F.R. § 1.671(b) (1994) (providing that the rules of evidence are to be applied
in PTO interference proceedings) with Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, Dep't of Labor,
312 U.S. 126, 155 (1941) (explaining that the technical rules of evidence do not apply to
proceedings before federal administrative agencies in the absence of statutory requirements that
such rules be observed).
17. Administrative agencies perform both informal actions and formal adversarial adjudicatory
proceedings. Michael H. Graham, Application of the Rules of Evidence in Administrative Agency
Formal Adversarial Adjudications: A New Approach, 1991 U. Ill. L. Rev. 353, 353. Generally,
rules of evidence are impractical for informal actions. Ia The patenting process is a hybrid of both
formal and informal processes. See discussion infra parts I.C. and III.A.
18. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988) provides in relevant part:
Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as a matter of policy shall
provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. A sanction
may not be imposed or a rule or order issued except on consideration of the whole record or
those parts thereof cited by a party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence.
See also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988) (allowing courts to set aside agency findings unsupported by
substantial evidence). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit uses the standard of "clearly
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standard by requiring examiners to evaluate the credibility and probative
value of evidence when determining patenting requirements.20
A common guide agencies use to evaluate hearsay is that mere rumor
will not support a finding, but hearsay may suffice if more evidence is
not conveniently available and if, in the end, the finding is supported by
the kind of evidence that responsible people generally rely upon in the
conduct of their affairs.2 Courts have supported this proposition under
the "substantial evidence" rule, a measure of the quantity of overall
evidence to support an administrative finding.' Under this test, the
agency views the record as a whole, accounting for factors such as the
hearsay's reliability, the availability of other evidence,, the presence of
corroborating evidence, and the need for administrative economy.'
B. Patentability Requirements
United States patent law requires that four conditions be met before
an invention receives a patent. The invention must be patentable subject
matter,24  useful,' novel,26  and non-obvious.27  Furthermore, the
specifications in the patent application must contain information about
erroneous," under which PTO findings are set aside if the court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. See In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
SSIH v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 381 (Fed. Cir. 1933) (Nies, J., additional
comments).
20. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2123 (5th
ed. rev. 1993) [hereinafter MPEP]; see also 37 C.F.R. § 10.150 (1994) (requiring the exclusion of
"irrelevant immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence" in disciplinarl proceedings). Many
agencies that address evidentiary issues either incorporate the APA standard or paraphrase it.
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Use of Federal Rules of Evidence in Federal Agency Adjudications, 39
Admin. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1987).
21. NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 576
(1938), rev'd on other grounds, Art Metals Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 110 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1940).
22. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 98-102 (1981) (holding that "substantial evidence" under
§ 556(d) of the APA is a minimum quantity of evidence sufficient to meet a preponderance of the
evidence standard); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 299 (1939)
(holding that substantial evidence is evidence affording a substantial basis of fact from which the
fact at issue can be reasonably inferred).
23. McCormick, supra note 7, § 354, at 1016.
24. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
25. IdM
26. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). Novelty demands that the invention was not known or used by
others prior to the time of invention by the applicant Id
27. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). Non-obviousness precludes the granting of a patent for an invention
if the invention would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the technical field of
the invention. Id
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the invention sufficient to enable a person, skilled in the technology to
which the invention pertains, to make and use the invention.28
Even if inventors meet these conditions, they may lose their rights to
patents because of the "statutory bars" of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
Specifically, this provision states:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless... the invention was
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one
year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United
29States ....
One rationale underlying the "public use or on sale" provision of 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) is to prevent the granting of a patent where it would
remove from the market inventions that the public believes are freely
available.3" Moreover, the statute precludes an inventor from patenting
inventions that already may have been used by other persons.
Accordingly, the public use or on-sale bar is not restricted to activities
by the applicant. Public use or on-sale activity of an invention by
anyone, with or without the consent or knowledge of the applicant
claiming a patent for that invention, will constitute a statutory bar to the
receipt of a patent.3
C. The Patent Application Process
1. The PTO's Evaluation of the Application: Prior Art Research and
Databases
The PTO makes decisions on whether to grant a patent based on the
evidence that it can locate or that is presented to it during the patent
application process. The application process is an ex parte proceeding
between the applicant and the PTO examiner and is commonly referred
28. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) (known as the enablement requirement).
29. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) (emphasis added). The date one year prior to the filing date is also
known as the "critical date," and the one-year provision as a "grace period" for the inventor to file
an application. Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 2-89.
30. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1016 (1986).
31. Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 19-20 (1939); Andrews v. Hovey, 124
U.S. 694, 718-19 (1888); Lorenz v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 167 F.2d 423,429 (3d Cir. 1948).
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to as patent "prosecution."32 Once an application is filed, a PTO
examiner is required to review the application and research the relevant
prior art for references that may indicate obviousness, a lack of
novelty, or a statutory bar.34 Examiners primarily search through
documentary prior art contained in the PTO libraries, such as U.S.
patents and prior-art publications.35 The examiner is not restricted to
searching existing patent files and other prior-art publications. An
examiner may also review any document that does not meet the
enablement requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112,36 but nevertheless, does
provide evidence of the obviousness of a software invention,37 including
commercial journals or computer magazines." It is during the review of
these documents that an examiner is likely to encounter written hearsay
statements.
The PTO has had difficulty researching software prior art because of
the lack of older software publications in its libraries. There are several
reasons for this deficiency in reference material. During the 1950s and
1960s, computer vendors created and sold software as part of bundled
hardware-software systems. As such, the only available references
were installed systems and a few informal publications such as
conference proceedings, technical manuals, or internal company reports.
Reference materials also are scarce because software patents were not
issued before 198 1,40 resulting in a lack of incentive for programmers to
publish their work. Companies instead chose to protect their software
under copyright or trade secret law. Thus, although much of the existing
32. Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 2-105. See generally 3 Donald S. Chisum, Patents: A
Treatise on the Law of Patentability, Validity, and Infringement § 11.03 (1994) (describing the
prosecution of a patent application).
33. "Prior art" is a term of art in patent law and refers to the conditiors that will preclude the
grant of a patent for an invention. Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 243. Prior art includes an
invention known or used by others, patented, or described in a publication before the applicant's
invention date; inventions statutorily barred; senior-filed patents; or prior inventions by other
persons. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), (e), (g) (1988).
34. See generally MPEP, supra note 20, §§ 700, 900, 2100 (describing the requirements of an
examination).
35. Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 242.
36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
37. Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 2-37.
38. Approximately 1300 technical periodical titles are in the PTO's scientific libraries. MPEP,
supra note 20, § 901.06(a).
39. Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 2-42.




software technology has been in public use and is well-known in the
field, there are few publications that document this usage.4'
The PTO has recently increased its use of computerized databases42 to
facilitate searches for software prior art.4 The PTO uses both on-line"
and CD-ROM databases.45 These databases provide abstracts or full-text
data of existing patents and other publications.46 Moreover, the PTO was
given access to the Software Patent Institute Database of Software
Technologies in 1994.' 7 In addition to educational research publications,
this database contains journals, computer manuals, and technical
memoranda from high-technology companies.48 The PTO will utilize
this database information to make patentability determinations on
software that may have been used previously or that is well-known in
the software community.
2. Rejection of Claims; Amendments or Challenges
Upon completion of the prior-art search, the examiner makes a
decision and communicates to the applicant through an "office action"
41. See generally USPTO Hearings in January-February 1994 Open Discussion on Controversy
and Solutions, SPI Rep. (Software Patent Inst., Ann Arbor, Mich.), Summer/Fall 1994, at 8-9
(discussing the lack of documentation of software prior art and the PTO's need for such references)
[hereinafter USPTO Hearings]. Although computer technology from the 1950s and 1960s may
appear to be outdated, many of their characteristics could render features of today's software
obvious or lacking in novelty. See supra notes 26-27; see also infra note 142 (describing the
revocation of a multimedia patent because of previously-known technology).
42. An entire collection of documents that is placed in an electronically readable form is known
as a "database." See generally Dr. J. Howard Bryant & Donald P. Stein, Automating the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, 11 Am. Pat. L. Ass'n Q.J. 25 (1983) (detailing the process in which
the PTO is attempting to convert its paper files into electronic form).
43. The PTO used 400 databases in 1992. 1992 Commissioner of Pat and Trademarks Ann.
Rep., at 32 [hereinafter 1992 Ann. Rep.].
44. On-line commercial databases currently used by the PTO include DIALOG, ORBIT,
DOE/RECON, INPADOC, and Questel. MPEP, supra note 20, § 901.06(a).
45. See generally Linda W. Helgerson, The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: Preparing for
the 21st Century, 72 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 577 (1990) (explaining the increased usage of
CD-ROM databases by the PTO). In contrast to on-line commercial database services, CD-ROM
databases involve the storage of a high volume of information in a disk residing at a user's local
workstation. Id at 582.
46. MPEP, supra note 20, § 901.06(a).
47. The Software Patent Institute Database, SPI Rep. (Software Patent Inst., Ann Arbor, Mich.),
Summer/Fall 1994, at 2. The Software Patent Institute is an organization founded by
high-technology industries with the goal of constructing a software prior art database for use by the
PTO and the public.
48. Id at2-4.
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that allows or rejects the applicant's claims.49 If the office action is
adverse, the burden shifts to the applicant to file a response amending
the patent claims or challenging the examiner's decision. The applicant
has three to six months to respond to an office action.51 The examiner
then re-evaluates the application, and the process is repeated until the
examiner allows the claims or issues a "Final Action" rejection that
satisfies the examiner's burden of persuasion that the applicant is not
entitled to a patent.52 The applicant may then appeal a rejection to the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.53
3. The Duty of Candor Requirements During Patent Prosecution
Because of the ex parte nature of patent prosecution and the difficulty
of conducting fully reliable and comprehensive PTO searches, the patent
rules impose a duty of full disclosure of known prior art on patent
applicants throughout the prosecution and even after the granting of a
patent. 4 Applicants must disclose information that they are aware is
material to the examination and must refrain from misrepresenting
facts.55 A violation of this duty may result in the unenforceability of the
patent during patent infringement litigation 6.5  This rule, however, does
not impose a duty on the applicant to conduct a prior-art search nor an
obligation to disclose art of which the applicant should reasonably be
aware.
5 7
49. 37 C.F.R. § 1.106 (1994); MPEP, supra note 20, § 2124. A "claim" is a specification on an
application which indicates the subject matter that applicants regard as their discovery or invention.
37 C.F.R. § 1.75(a) (1994). More than one claim may be presented in a application. 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.75(b) (1994).
50. 37 C.F.R. § 1.111 (1994).
51. Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 2-106 n.13.
52. 37 C.F.R. § 1.113 (1994). Current PTO practice is to make a second office action final.
Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 2-107 n.21. The examiner has a burden to reject applications
based upon a preponderance of the evidence. See infra notes 111-17 and a,.companying text.
53. 37 C.F.R. § 1.191 (1994). If the Board's decision also is adverse, tht applicant may appeal to
the Federal Circuit or file a civil action in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 35 U.S.C.
§§ 141, 145 (1988).
54. Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 2-42, 2-118. See also Stephen C. Shear & William S.
Galliani, Patent Practice: Strategies for Submitting Newly Discovered Prior Art After Allowance of
an Application, 7 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1 (1991) (recommending methods for
disclosing prior art after the allowance of patent claims).
55. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1994).
56. Chisum & Jacobs, supra note 2, at 2-117,2-285.
57. American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1362 (Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
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The Federal Circuit has extensively analyzed the questions of
materiality of the known prior art and the required level of culpability.58
Under current rules, information is material to patentability if it
establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a prima
facie case of unpatentability 9 The court judges culpability based on a
finding of an intent to deceive the PTO, but considers any evidence
indicative of the applicant's good faith.60
II. OVERVIEW OF 17VRE EPSTEIN
A. Facts of the Case
Morris Epstein filed an application with the PTO on March 21, 1989,
for his computerized warehouse. Epstein's application involved a system
that stored information on vendors' products in a central computer.
Buyers could communicate with the system via remote terminals,
determine what products were available, and place orders
electronically.6'
In the first office action, the examiner allowed all but three of
Epstein's fifty-eight pending claims.62 In a subsequent office action,
another examiner withdrew the previous allowance and rejected all the
pending claims, relying on six newly discovered prior-art software
products described in various abstracts, including some retrieved from a
database. Several of the abstracts were published after Epstein's filing
date, but each abstract asserted that similar products were "first
installed" or "released" more than one year prior to that date.63 The PTO
58. See, e.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed Cir. 1984) (holding
that a prior art reference is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable patent
examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to issue a patent), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
822 (1985).
59. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b)(1) (1994).
60. Kingsdown Medical Consultants Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989). An intent to deceive and materiality are inverse elements in
that a greater showing of one requires a lesser showing of the other. American Hoist, 725 F.2d at
1363. See also Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that
gross negligence is sufficient to show wrongful intent and inequitable conduct); Kansas Jack, Inc.
v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that wrongful intent is present when the
actor knew or should have known of the materiality of the reference); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All
Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that simple negligence
or error in judgment made in good faith is insufficient to constitute inequitable conduct).
61. In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
62. Id. See supra note 49-52 and accompanying text.
63. The publications were:
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recognized that only one of the abstracts was a prior-ait publication and
that the other abstracts were not prior art publications but only
referenced prior-art products.' Epstein appealed to the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences, but it sustained the rejections. 5 Epstein then
appealed to the Federal Circuit.
Epstein's primary ground for appeal was that the PTO had not met its
evidentiary burden of proving the "in public use or on sale" status of the
prior art software by a preponderance of the evidence." Specifically, he
argued that the "release" and "first installed" dates asserted in the
abstracts were hearsay statements and that the Board erred in relying on
the dates to establish when the software was "in public use or on sale."'67
Epstein also argued that the Board erred in finding "that the abstracts
evidenced the level of skill in the art at the time the software was sold.6
B. The Court's Holding and Reasoning
The court agreed that the statements in the abstracts were hearsay.69
The statements were out-of-court written assertions offered by the PTO
to prove the truth of the matter asserted, namely, ithat the software
products were "in public use or on sale" more than one year before
Epstein's filing date.7" The court, however, applied the general rule that
1) "CONTROL SYSTEM" software, described in an undated databse printout stating a
release date of January 1982.
2) "SMART/SCSS" software, described in a catalog dated February 1991 stating a first
installation date of January 1987.
3) "Pro-Search" software, described in an undated database printout stating release dates of
October 1986 for version 1.08 and October 1987 for version 1.07.
4) "DIALOG" database system, described in a seminar book dated June 1988 containing
DIALOG descriptions dated March 1987.
5) "CONTROL SYSTEM" software, described in a catalog dated FebruEtry 1991 stating a first
installation date of March 1982.
6) "DS2000" software, described in a catalog dated February 1991 staling a first installation
date of 1977.
Epstein, 32 F.3d at 1562-63.
64. Id. at 1563. The DIALOG seminar book was a prior-art publication in that it was published
before Epstein's filing date. See supra note 33.
65. Epstein, 32 F.3d at 1563.
66. Id
67. Id at 1565.
68. Id at 1563. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.




administrative agencies, like the PTO, are not bound by the formal rules
of evidence and that hearsay evidence may be relied upon to reject
patent applications.7" The court allowed the use of hearsay because it
would not conflict with the policy of admitting only evidence subject to
cross-examination.' The court reasoned that strict adherence to the
hearsay rule was not appropriate because patent prosecution is a
non-adversarial, ex parte proceeding and because cross-examination is
unnecessary when hearsay is sufficiently reliable.73 Moreover, the
applicant has the opportunity to investigate the hearsay during the
three- to six-month response period following an office action, to
introduce rebuttal evidence, and to cross-examine the authors of the
hearsay statements by bringing an action in a federal district court.74
The court also rejected Epstein's argument that the abstracts were
inaccurate, untrustworthy, or exaggerated. According to the court, this
would require an assumption that the software vendors who originated
the abstracts were engaged in false and misleading advertising.75
Because of Epstein's failure to provide evidence of such deception and
because the abstracts appeared facially reliable, the court assumed their
truthfulness.76
Finally, the court addressed Epstein's argument that the abstracts may
have described experimental products77 or that the software described in
the abstracts may have been different from what was actually installed
or used. The court stated that public use or sale had to be "inferred," and
it was able to make these inferences because the abstracts were in
publications containing sales information, listing the number of users,
and indicating the installation and release dates.7' Furthermore, the
products were commercial in nature and had features that would not
change over the life of the product.79 As a result, the court concluded
71. Id
72. Id at 1565-66.
73. Id
74. Id
75. Id at 1566.
76. Id
77. 'Even if a product was in public use or on sale, the statutory bar does not apply if the use was
primarily for a bona fide experimental purpose rather than commercial exploitation. Tone Bros.,
Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1199-1200 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1356
(1995). Any sales of the product outside the grace period must be merely incidental to the primary
purpose of experimentation. Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., Ltd., 731 F.2d
831, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See supra note 29.
78. Epstein, 32 F.3d at 1566-67.
79. Id.
Washington Law Review
that the products were commercially sold and evidenced the level of
skill in the art at the time of their alleged sale."
In his concurrence, Judge Plager agreed with the policy of allowing
the PTO to use its resources to identify legitimate questions on
patentability and then to require the applicant to find the answers. He
argued that, once the PTO meets this burden of production, it is not
unreasonable to shift the burden to the applicant who may know more
about the relevant prior art than the examiner.8 2 He warned, however,
that the PTO may use its relaxed burden as a means lo delay or harass
applicants. 3
III. FLAWS IN THE EPSTEINDECISION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
While the court was correct in determining that administrative
agencies are not bound by the rules of evidence, Epstein creates several
negative implications and leaves many questions unanswered. Despite
the inherent weaknesses of hearsay evidence, the court failed to provide
guidelines for examiners or the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences when deciding the admissibility or credibility of hearsay
evidence. The court also failed to define a standard for the evaluation of
the probative worth of hearsay evidence that satisfies the PTO's burden
of persuasion when rejecting applications.84
Epstein also creates concerns regarding which party should bear the
burden of investigating hearsay; invites abuse by Third-party patent
competitors who may submit false and misleading information after
prosecution begins; opens the door to possible abuse by PTO examiners;
and confuses the duty of candor requirements.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1570.
82. Id. at 1570-71.
83. Id. at 1571.
84. See supra note 52.
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A. The PTO's Evaluation of Hearsay
1. The Court Failed To Place Adequate Limitations on Hearsay
Admissibility
In declaring the exclusionary rules of evidence inapplicable in ex
parte administrative proceedings, the court failed to mention the APA's
evidentiary limitations," The mere fact that the APA allows hearsay
under certain circumstances does not mean that no restrictions are placed
on administrative agencies and that evidence may be admitted regardless
of its value. 6 In effect, the Epstein court has placed few restrictions on
the receipt of hearsay during patent prosecution. The admission of a
large volume of low-quality evidence may contribute significantly to the
length and costs of an agency's adjudications. 7
The court should have considered and applied the APA standards that
govern the admissibility of evidence in other administrative agencies'
formal adversarial adjudications. Although any form of evidence may
be received, the agency must provide for the exclusion of unreliable
evidence. Several commentators suggest that exclusionary rules should
be applied as administrative proceedings approach judicial trials in
formality of process and substantive rights. 9
The process of applying for a patent is a formal adversarial
adjudication in many respects. The initial review of patent applications
by an examiner, although an ex parte proceeding suggestive of an
85. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The PTO applies the APA to its proceedings. See,
e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
86. McCormick, supra note 7, § 352, at 1011. See also Davis, supra note 13, § 16.4, at 234
(noting that although administrative agencies may be free from the strict common-law rules of
evidence for jury trials, it is erroneous to suppose that agencies do not observe some rules of
evidence). "Any acceptable process must be fair and predictable." James L. Rose, Hearsay in
Administrative Agency Adjudications, 6 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 459, 478 (1992). Any uncontrolled
and open admission of all evidence "for whatever it is worth," regardless of its reliability, is neither
fair nor predictable. Id
87. Pierce, supra note 20, at 23.
88. See supra note 19. The APA defines adjudication as an agency process for the formulation of
an order. 5 U.S.C. § 551(7) (1988). Order is defined as "the whole or a part of a final
disposition.., of an agency in a matter other than rulemaking but including licensing." 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(6) (1988). The PTO functions as a decision maker, in a licensing proceeding for a patent,
which is essentially a revocable license to maintain a private action for infringement. K. Carl Moy,
Commentary: Authority of the Commissioner over the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences,
76 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 391, 392 (1994). In the process of conducting an ex parte
examination, the Examining Corps is performing an adjudication of an initial licensing transaction.
Id
89. E.g., Gellhorn, supra note 13, at 16.
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"informal" agency action," involves aspects of judicial proceedings. The
examiner acts like a trial judge by resolving evidentiary issues,
determining prima facie cases for unpatentability, and applying
established case law in the evaluation of claims.9" These characteristics
are particularly true in the appeals made to the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences. The Board is a quasi-judicial adjudicatory body
imbued with court-like qualities. 2 The Board accepts legal briefs, holds
hearings, and issues written opinions.93 Having many of the procedures
of a formal trial, the patent application process requires, at a minimum,
that the PTO apply some restrictions on the admissibility of hearsay.
In addition to the procedural similarities between patent prosecution
and formal trials, there are substantive similarities. Hearsay evidence
should receive close examination, and its use should ba. limited because
substantial statutory rights, founded on the Constitution, are being
determined. Applicants are seeking a patent that will grant them
exclusive property rights to their inventions.94 Much like real property,
patents grant their owners a bundle of rights, particularly the right to
exclude the rest of the world from enjoyment and dominion over their
patents." This right is sanctioned and enforced by the federal courts
90. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. In informal actions, hearsay evidence is generally
acceptable for various policy reasons, including the need for expeditious, inexpensive, and efficient
justice. Large numbers of cases, that seldom involve issues of credibility, are thus resolved.
Gellhom, supra note 13, at 6. Subjects of informal actions include tax return processing,
workmen's compensation claims, and social security entitlements. Id.; Rose, supra note 86, at 460.
91. United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 363 (1888) ("The patent ... is the
result of a course of proceeding, quasi judicial in its character....); Buttorworth v. United States
ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50, 67 (1884) (explaining that patent examiners are quasi-judicial officials);
Western Elec. Co. v. Piezo Technology, Inc., 860 F.2d 428, 432 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that
patent examiners, like judges, cannot be deposed as to their mental process;o; MPEP, supra note 20,
§§ 2123-2125 (specifying the legal and factual issues that an examiner must resolve).
92. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Mayer, J., dissenting). The Board
presides over hearings involving an adversarial conflict between an applicant and an examiner
arguing against patentability. Id. at 1573. See also Commissioner Conf,rs Title of 'Judge' on
Patent and Trademark Board Members, [May-Oct. 1993 Transfer Binder] 46 Pat., Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1151, at 534 (Oct. 21, 1993) (announcing that Board members have new
designations as "Administrative Patent Judges").
93. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1574 (Mayer, J., dissenting). See also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.191-.198 (1994)
(regarding proceedings before the Board).
94. The Constitution gives Congress the power "To promote the Progress of... useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries." U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). See also 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988) (stating that patents shall
have the attributes of real property).
95. 1 Irving Kayton, Patent Practice 1-23 to 1-24 (PRI 1993). Patent laws give the patent holder
a right to exclude all others from making, using, or selling the invention in the United States for 17
years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
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against unauthorized infringement.' Accordingly, the applicant is
entitled to have these rights determined based on the consideration of
reliable evidence. The Constitution's goal of promoting the progress of
science will be truly satisfied only if inventors are given the incentive to
create with the knowledge that they will receive a fair adjudication of
their rights.
2. The Court Did Not Require the PTO To Resolve Issues of Hearsay
Credibility
For hearsay to be admitted, the proponent must show that it meets a
minimum threshold of probable reliability for it to be worthy of
consideration." This does not mean that hearsay must be true. Receipt of
evidence only requires that the evidence be of sufficient probable
reliability so that the opponent must counter it.99 The PTO recognizes
this principle by requiring examiners to resolve issues of authenticity of
evidence before rejecting an application under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)." °
While hearsay must be looked at more closely than legally competent
evidence, the Epstein court gave the hearsay at issue only a minimal
examination and ignored the prerequisite of establishing probable
reliability prior to making a rejection that requires a response from the
applicant.'' Instead, the court assumed the truthfulness of the abstracts
because of their facial accuracy and because of the absence of
contradictory evidence to disprove their reliability." The problem with
the court's assumption of accuracy is that the dates in abstracts will
always appear "facially" accurate absent glaring inconsistencies with
other data in the abstract.0 3 The main source of inaccuracy, however,
96. 1 Kayton, supra note 95, at 1-5.
97. Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("[W]hen governmental
agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of
individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been
associated with the judicial process.").
98. Rose, supra note 86, at 478.
99. Id.
100. MPEP, supra note 20, §§ 2123-2124.
101. The Federal Circuit makes a de novo review of examiner and Board actions. In re Alappat,
33 F.3d 1526, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Mayer, J., dissenting).
102. In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
103. See Anne P. Mintz, Quality Control and the Zen of Database Production, Online, Nov.
1990, at 15, 18-19 (discussing how numerical errors in databases are often subtle and only users
with a high degree of familiarity with the entries can spot the errors).
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occurs in the initial construction and entry of the database abstract.1 4
Because of the human work involved, inadvertent errors in dates can
occur in the original hardcopy documents, in a summarization process,
or in data entry.' Frequently, the dates entered into a database come
from mental recollection rather than written records. 1"e Besides
inadvertent errors, intentional inaccuracies may exist in the database.
Although in most instances vendors are engaged in honest conduct, the
highly competitive nature of the computer industry could lead vendors to
exaggerate or even misrepresent the capabilities of their products. The
computer industry provides numerous examples of failed expectations of
manufacturers on the availability and capability of their products. 7
Thus, the chance for inaccuracy can be high. Potential loss of accuracy
as information is transmitted to second- and third-hand sources is one of
the primary justifications for the hearsay rule and underscores the need
to ensure the substantial reliability of such information prior to giving it
probative value.'
The Epstein court also decided that because the features described in
the abstracts were not the kind that would change over the course of
104. Id. at 16-17. Also, the correction of database errors is an infrequent, lengthy, and expensive
process. Id at 22.
105. Id. at 15-17.
106. The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize an exception for recorded recollection, but to be
admissible, the data must have been recorded while the matter was fresh in the memory so as to
reflect the knowledge correctly. Fed. R. Evid. 803(5). Other sources of error result from the
terminology in the abstracts. In the evolutionary environment of computer technology, terms
become obsolete or inconsistent among the different literature. USPTO Hearings, supra note 41, at
9. Errors may occur when the terminology is translated into present language. A term may become
a source of confusion if one source had used customized terms which differed from normal usage.
The accuracy of terminology becomes relevant when an abstract is evaluated for novelty or non-
obviousness. The features described in an abstract must contain consistent terminology during the
relevant time periods when the product was supposedly in use. The primary reason for this
requirement is to determine the extent to which subsequent inventions are similar. Another reason
is to assist in the actual prior art searching scheme for databases, which is clone through a keyword
search. See generally Bryant & Stein, supra note 42 (describing database searching techniques).
107. See, e.g., Intel's Chip Problems Not Ending; Computer Users Are Not Happy with Intel's
Decision Not to Recall the Flawed Pentium Chip, Orlando Sentinel, Dec. 19, 1994, at A6
(discussing the chances of mathematical errors caused by Intel's chip). Intel claimed that errors
would occur every 27,000 years, while some in the technical community estimated that an error
would occur every 24 days. Id.
108. United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir.) (explaining how the complex
nature of computer storage calls for a more comprehensive check for trustworthiness, including a
delineation of procedures for ensuring accuracy and reliability), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977).
See also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Electronic Records Management and Archives, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
963, 1000 (1992) (noting that because electronic records are particularly susceptible to purposeful
or accidental alterations, or incorrect processing, the efforts to authenticate them may be more
difficult than when paper records are examined).
Patent Hearsay
time, it was reasonable to infer that the products described were the
same as those installed and used during the dates in question." 9 While
this may have been true regarding the particular system involved in
Epstein's application, the same cannot be said about software
technology in general. Software technology is a rapidly-changing field,
with any particular type of software quickly becoming obsolete.1
Accordingly, it will be common to find instances where the products
indicated during dates of first use are significantly different from the
ones described in subsequently published abstracts.
The PTO should not presume the accuracy of hearsay dates indicated
in abstracts, particularly those dealing with software. The Epstein court
seems to have established such a presumption by giving hearsay
statements the equivalent credibility value that is given to legally
admissible evidence. In doing so, the court did not enforce its general
rule that probable credibility must be established before rejecting a
claim.
3. The Court Did Not Clarify When the Probative Worth of Hearsay
Is Sufficient To Meet the PTO's Burden of Persuasion
Once hearsay is determined to be sufficiently credible, the examiner
must evaluate the weight that it should be accorded. This analysis of
probative worth judges the credibility of hearsay against conflicting
evidence and its relevance against other credible evidence."' To reject a
claim under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), the PTO must meet a preponderance of
the evidence standard.' There is a preponderance of evidence that 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) activity, such as public use or sale, was present if it is
more likely than not that the alleged activity occurred."' The examiner
initially may meet this burden by making a prima facie showing that the
claimed invention was in public use or on sale more than one year before
109. In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1994). See also J.A. LaPorte, Inc. v. Norfolk
Dredging Co., 787 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed. Cir.) ('[O]ur precedent holds that the question
is... whether the sale relates to a device that embodies the invention."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 884
(1986).
110. See generally Reed R. Heimbecher, Note, Proposed Prior Art Legislation for Computer
Program Patent Applications: Creating a Potentialfor Co-Existing Patents, 13 Hastings Comm. &
Ent. L.J. 57 (1990) (discussing the ramifications of the accelerating technology of software in
comparison to the slower patenting process).
111. Rose, supra note 86, at 478.
112. In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985); MPEP, supra note 20, § 2124.
113. See McCormick, supra note 7, § 339, at 957 (explaining that proof by a preponderance is
proof that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its non-existence).
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the patent application.114 The examiner may then require the applicant to
challenge the findings." 5 Before the applicant assumes this task,
however, an examiner must provide some evidence to establish the
reasonableness of the rejection." 6 This determination of the probative
worth of the evidence includes, at a minimum, an examination of the
quantity and quality of the evidence as well as the circunstantial setting
of the case." 7
Arguably, the Epstein court applied these standards correctly. There
was a sufficient quantum of hearsay in the form of six abstracts, and
some measure of quality was present in the consislency among the
abstracts."' Viewed under all the circumstances, it was probably
reasonable for the PTO to shift tile burden to Epstein." 9
The court, however, did not provide sufficient guidance for the
examiner to decide when it can justifiably shift the burden on the
applicant to challenge hearsay. Questions exist as to what constitutes a
reasonable finding based on hearsay. A problem would occur, for
example, if only one abstract were found providing a hearsay statement
on a release date. Another problem may occur if hearsay came from an
abstract in an obscure publication rather than one that was well-known
or inherently accurate. Epstein fails to address issues such as the
quantum of hearsay evidence sufficient for a rejection, the need for
corroboration by legally competent evidence, and the sources of hearsay
that can be given more probative value. The court has given PTO
examiners broad discretion in determining the existence of 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) activity.
114. Caveney, 761 F.2d at 674.
115. Exparte Skinner, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1788, 1789 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interferences 1986).
116. Id.
117. McCormick, supra note 7, § 353, at 1015-16.
118. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. All the abstracts described a similar system. The
"CONTROL SYSTEM" software described in both the database printout and in the catalog
indicated approximate release dates of January 1982 and March 1982, respectively. The release
dates of the "Pro-Search" software were reasonably proximate to each ether. Version 1.08 was
released in October 1986, and version 1.07 was released in October 1987.
119. In patent law, the prima facie case is generally an elusive concept, with no clear definition.
Irah H. Donner, Obviousness Rejections: Doing the 'Tango' with the PTO, The Computer Law.,
Aug. 1994, at 15, 16. As a result examiners usually do not provide suffi,,ient reasons to support
their prima facie cases, and applicants lack the information to properly contest the rejections. Id.
Vol. 70:805, 1995
Patent Hearsay
B. Undue Burden on Patent Applicants
The court justified shifting the burden to the applicant because of the
numerous options available to the applicant to investigate and challenge
rejections based on hearsay.2 and because applicants will generally
know more about existing software than an examiner.' It is particularly
appropriate for the examiner to shift the burden when the possible
trustworthiness of the hearsay is substantial. In such a case, the
distinction between the hearsay and any other legally competent
evidence would be minimal. The applicant would be no worse off than if
the examiner had based its findings on legally admissible evidence.
However, if the PTO rejects an applicant's claims based on highly
questionable hearsay, then not only has it failed to meet its burden of
persuasion, but it also may have wrongfully and unduly burdened an
applicant.
Besides the normal expenses of filing a patent, it may be extremely
costly and inefficient for an applicant to locate the originator of hearsay
to obtain an affidavit or to institute a trial proceeding to rebut the
probable falsity of the hearsay." A typical software company may be
reluctant to disclose information on its activities for fear that doing so
might provide competitors a trail to its research and development."2 As
a result, an applicant easily can be "stonewalled" when investigating a
hearsay assertion. A company also could stall an applicant long enough
for the time limit for an office action response to expire. Furthermore,
the applicant may encounter difficulty locating the source of hearsay
because the software company claiming prior use may be defunct, with
its employees scattered throughout the industry. 24 One justification for
the hearsay rule is that the evidence should be excluded because the
declarant is not available for cross-examination. This justification is
clearly applicable to fair patent prosecution.
120. See supra note 74 and accompanying text
121. In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Plager, J., concurring).
122. Some of the representative costs include $3000 to $8000 for filing preparation, $1000 to
$3000 for PTO processing, and $500 to $2000 for attorney fees to research patents. Torsten Busse,
Software Floods the Patent Office, InfoWorld, Sept. 30, 1991, at 39. See also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.16-
.28 (1994) (regarding patent fees).
123. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text for a discussion on the reluctance of
software companies to publish their work.
124. See generally Steven Burke, Software Startups Say Big Firms Bully Them Through the
Courts, PC Week, Dec. 8, 1987, at 189 (reporting on how established software firms have used
lawsuits to cause many small firms to go out of business or to lose employees).
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The PTO is expected to make a thorough search of the prior art."
Epstein is faulty because its holding gives the PTO increased authority
to impose this burden on the applicant.'26 In these situations, it may be
appropriate to require applicants to make only a good-faith effort to
locate the declarant and then to allow their claims for a patent. Instead,
under Epstein, the applicant has been unfairly burdened with a task that
the PTO should shoulder. The balancing of interests and equities
strongly suggests that, in many circumstances, the PTO should bear the
burden of overcoming hearsay or else grant a patent.
C. Potential for Abuse
Judge Plager, in his concurrence, warned of potenlial abuse by the
PTO as a result of relaxing its evidentiary burden. Simi.larly, because of
the highly competitive and lucrative software industry, the Epstein
decision also may encourage abuse of the system by third-party
challengers to a patent application. Conceivably, competitors can
successfully defeat a pending patent by producing a publication,
subsequent to the filing date of an application, which indicates falsified
"on sale" dates. Suppose, for example, that X files for a software patent
in 1995. Its considerably larger and wealthier competitor, Y, learns of the
pending application and produces a falsified document in 1996
indicating that software having characteristics similar to X's pending
patent was first used by Y in 1991. The document could eventually enter
a database abstract or may be given directly to the PTO. The PTO would
then rely on the hearsay to reject X's application and impose on X the
burden of disproving the hearsay. If X does not have the resources to
continue patent prosecution through an investigation or a civil action to
cross-examine Y, then the application may have to be abandoned. The
Epstein decision's failure to provide a standard could give an unfair
advantage to unscrupulous and more financially resourceful
companies.127
125. "mhe examiner shall make a thorough study ... and investigation of the available prior
art.. ." before formulating a possible rejection of the claimed subject matter under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b). 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a) (1994).
126. In re Epstein, 32 F.3d 1559, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Plager, J., concurring).
127. See, e.g., Fraige v. American-National Watermattress Corp., 996 F.2d 295, 296 (Fed. Cir.
1993). In a similar fact pattern, the president of American-National presented false and doctored
documentation as part of its defense in a patent infringement suit. Id. 'Die company altered an




The potential for abuse by the PTO is a recognizable danger.
Certainly, there exists the possibility of examiners stalling or harassing
applicants, as warned by Judge Plager."' Examiners are expected to
review a certain number of applications in a given time period.'29 They
might readily reject applications involving hearsay issues in order to
focus their attention on other patents. Consequently, deserving
applicants would be unfairly burdened in comparison to other applicants.
Judge Plager stated that the abuse is something that the PTO and the
court will have to guard against. Unfortunately, the court may not have
the resources or the opportunity to maintain the vigil. The solution lies
not in relaxing the PTO's burden and monitoring for abuse, but in
articulating a standard for the PTO to follow, checking only for
consistency in its decisions.
D. The Duty of Candor
The PTO's ability to rely on hearsay evidence presents unanswered
questions regarding the applicant's duty of candor. The first involves the
issue of materiality. Generally, the PTO relies on an applicant's
disclosure of public use or on-sale activity to determine if a statutory bar
exists. Because of this, applicants are required to disclose information
which they know will make their claims prima facie unpatentable."0
Although applicants are not required to conduct a prior-art search, most
do some research before filing applications.' With the increased
availability of databases for research, an applicant will probably locate
hearsay evidence of public use or sale. The Epstein court made hearsay
128. Epstein, 32 F.3d at 1571 (Plager, J., concurring).
129. See PTO Wins Majority of FSIP Orders on Disputes over New Technology, 21 Gov't Empl.
Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1537, at 1407 (Oct. 25, 1993) (detailing a union's allegation that the PTO
uses time-based production quotas which require employees to maintain extensive documentation
on time worked and production achieved); Bruce Rubenstein, Novell's Mother of All Prior Art
Suits Nears Court Date: Billings Will Be Either a Billionaire or Broke, Corp. Legal Times, July
1994, at 17 (mentioning how performance bonuses under President Ronald Reagan's era
encouraged a 22-hour maximum in the examination of applications); Wright v. Brown, No.
92-1540, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 11502, at *10-*11 (4th Cir. May 17, 1993) (ruling against an
examiner who alleged disparate treatment due to his inability to meet production quotas).
130. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1994). The court has not yet evaluated a case under this new regulation.
As such, the established standard of materiality may still be followed by the court in that
information is material if a reasonable examiner would consider it important in determining
patentability. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
131. See Hilary E. Pearson, How to Keep Your Hands Clean-The Developing US. Law on
Inequitable Conduct in Patent Prosecution, 3 Intell. Prop. J. 91, 100-03 (1987) (suggesting ways
to prevent an invalidation of a patent due to "unclean hands").
Washington Law Review
statements material, but it did not indicate the level of materiality that
would require disclosure. Because applicants are given no guidance on
how the PTO will weigh the value of hearsay, they may have to assume
that the PTO will give hearsay the same consideration as admissible
evidence. As a result, the applicants may have to reduce the number and
scope of their patent claims to prevent invalidation for inequitable
conduct.
This issue presents a unique problem. By limiting their claims based
on the discovered hearsay, applicants may erroneously limit their full
rights to a patent. An applicant without the resources to challenge PTO
findings based on hearsay is necessarily required to limit the full extent
of his claims in the patent application. This result is unfair to an
applicant when the hearsay is actually unreliable.
Another implication results from the court's failure to articulate a
standard on how the PTO should evaluate hearsay. Epstein provides an
applicant or attorney little guidance to properly judge the credibility and
probative worth of hearsay.13 This blurs the difference between
good-faith errors of judgment and actionable gross negligence. 3 ' It is
possible, for instance, that an applicant who ignores the barest of
hearsay assertions may be subject to discipline.
IV. A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR THE EVALUATION OF
HEARSAY
A. Proposed Guidelines
Like other administrative agencies, the PTO should create evidentiary
guidelines for examiners. As a general rule, the PTO should evaluate
hearsay for its credibility and relative worth, considering all the
circumstances pertinent to the application. The underlying premise is
that the reliability of hearsay can range anywhere from the least to the
most reliable.' Administrative agencies have fashioned several criteria
to determine the reliability of hearsay and the weight it should be
given."' These factors, generally upheld under the substantial evidence
rule, involve a consideration of the whole record, coupled with a
132. See Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 157E, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(explaining that an attorney must exercise judgment when deciding what to disclose).
133. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
134. Kenneth C. Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 689, 689
(1964).




balancing of interests.'36 These criteria would be particularly appropriate
to the PTO as a non-exhaustive guide.
First, examiners should determine the nature of the hearsay. If the
hearsay is intrinsically reliable, then it may be considered even though it
may not technically fall within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Under this test, the evaluation of the credibility of hearsay would take
into account the source of the statements. This approach is similar to the
business-records exception to the hearsay rule. Hearsay originating from
commercial publications, such as sales publications or promotional
brochures, should be considered less reliable due to the tendency of such
publications to exaggerate the capabilities of the products described. In
contrast, hearsay originating from technical works, such as operating
manuals, research manuals, or internal company documents should be
given greater deference because of their inherent reliability. Similarly,
hearsay found in obscure publications should be given less weight than
hearsay from a well-established publication. Increased scrutiny will help
to curb any abuse of the patenting system by third parties who may
submit falsified hearsay.
Second, examiners should determine whether hearsay can be
substantiated by corroborating evidence. If the PTO can easily find
evidence to corroborate the hearsay, then it will be given more
credibility. Thus, if an examiner locates several other references that
tend to indicate public use or sale, some of which is hearsay and some of
which may be legally admissible evidence, then a sufficient quantum of
proof has been reached. A single, obscure reference is insufficient
evidence for rejection unless other factors are taken into account.
Third, the examiner should be required to weigh the importance of the
subject matter against the costs of acquiring better evidence. Under this
test, if the hearsay declarant is not readily available and the issues
involved are substantial, then the hearsay by itself carries little weight.
136. State courts developed the legal residuum rule as a complement to the substantial evidence
rule. See, e.g., Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 113 N.E. 507 (N.Y. 1916). This rule required that
hearsay evidence be corroborated by some legally admissible evidence in order to support an
administrative finding. Leonard M. Simon, Note, The Weight to Be Given Hearsay Evidence by
Administrative Agencies: The "Legal Residuum" Rule, 26 Brook. L. Rev. 265, 267 (1960). In
contrast to the substantial evidence rule's focus on quantity, the legal residuum rule is a measure of
the quality of the evidence. Id The rule was severely criticized by scholars and is no longer used in
federal courts. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971) (holding that uncorroborated
hearsay can constitute substantial evidence if reliable); see also Davis, supra note 13, §§ 16.6-.8
(discussing the legal residuum rule and analyzing case law since Richardson v. Perales). In this
respect, corroborating evidence is used as a factor, instead of a requirement, in determining the
reliability of hearsay.
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For example, if the declarant is a foreign entity, then allowing hearsay
may not be appropriate given the applicant's logistical difficulty of
cross-examining the declarant. In fact, the unavailability of a declarant
for cross-examination is one of the main justifications for the
exclusionary rule.137 Whether the issues involved are substantial will
vary from one application to another. A complete rejection of an
application based on hearsay is substantial per se and warrants scrutiny
of the hearsay. In contrast, a limitation on claims may not be sufficiently
substantial to bar the acceptance of the hearsay. When a limitation on
claims is issued, the patent is not completely rejected but is only granted
a more limited scope. However, a limitation on claims to the point where
the patent is commercially worthless would be substantial.
Fourth, examiners must weigh the need for precision. In general,
hearsay cannot be given probative worth where factual determinations
require a high level of precision. For example, the use by other agencies
of statistical evidence is generally acceptable even without precision. In
patent law, however, dates are critical for determining statutory bars and
are carefully detailed by applicants.13 Hearsay stating vague dates in
terms of years rather than specific dates of public use or sale should be
given scrutiny. In contrast, hearsay, which describes features of an
invention, need not be highly precise to determine novelty or
non-obviousness. A general description of product features can lead a
reasonable examiner to conclude that there is a lack of novelty or non-
obviousness in such cases.
It may be proper, however, to require applicants to bear the burden of
disproving hearsay, particularly in instances where broad claims are
involved. The allowance of broad claims would give applicants greater
power to enforce their patents over other potential users. Accordingly,
applicants should "earn" this powerful right by bearing the burden in
these situations. When agencies make decisions, they decide not only the
particular cases before them but also the ramifications of their decisions
on the public. Thus, examiners should consider administrative policies
and the potential impact of their decisions to guide them in their
evaluation of hearsay.
137. McCormick, supra note 7, § 252, at 751.
138. See, e.g., 37 C.F.Rt § 1.53(b) (1994) (specifying how filing dates are recorded); 37 C.F.R.
§§ 1.6-.7 (1994) (providing guidelines on determining the appropriate dates of filing when
applications are received on weekends or holidays); William C. Rooklidge, Application of the
On-Sale Bar to Activities Performed Before Reduction to Practice, 72 J. Pat. & Trademark Off.
Soc'y 543, 544 (1990) (explaining that because of the strict construction of the on-sale bar,
attorneys and inventors seek to precisely identify events raising an on-sale bar).
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B. Justifications for Maintaining a High Burden on the PTO
Scrutiny of hearsay by the PTO would probably add to the backlog of
pending patents'39 and could result in the erroneous issuance of some
patents, many of which may eventually be challenged through litigation.
The PTO may not have all the necessary resources to conduct a thorough
search to investigate hearsay. In situations where there are inadequate
resources, the PTO may be forced to issue a patent because it does not
have sufficient evidence to properly reject an application. There are,
however, several policy considerations and procedural safeguards that
justify maintaining the initial burden on the PTO to establish a prima
facie showing of unpatentability.
Most significantly, the Federal Circuit recognizes that it is the PTO's
burden to show why an applicant is not entitled to a patent, rather than
the applicant's burden to show why he is entitled to one. 40 Moreover,
the PTO is advocating the use of re-examination procedures where third
parties may invalidate an issued patent.'4 ' Thus, if a questionable patent
has been issued because of the PTO's failure to substantiate hearsay,
third parties may request re-examination procedures or the PTO may
re-examine the patent on its own initiative.142
Another safeguard is the existence of public-use proceedings in which
pending patents may be challenged.'43 These proceedings will become
more significant if the PTO adopts proposed rules that will make patent
applications public eighteen months after filing.'" As of 1992, the
139. See 1992 Ann. Rep., supra note 43, at 25 (reporting on 295,096 pending utility, plant, and
reissue patents at the end of 1992).
140. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Plager, J., concurring); In re Warner,
379 F.2d 1011, 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1057 (1968). The rule in patent law is
contrary to that of other agencies. Under the APA, the proponent of an administrative order has the
burden of proof. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988).
141. 1992 Ann. Rep., supra note 43, at 13. See also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.510-.565 (1994). A
re-examination involves the re-evaluation of an issued patent for patentability requirements.
142. See, e.g., Sabra Chartrand, At the Patent Office, a Digital Dawn, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12,
1994, at A39. After a multimedia patent was issued to Compton's New Media, the Commissioner
ordered a re-examination because of protests from the software industry. During the
re-examination, PTO examiners expanded their original search and found several prior-art
references. As a result, the PTO revoked the issued patent. l
143. 37 C.F.R. § 1.292 (1994). Ironically, these proceedings require the application of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 37 C.F.R. § 1.292(a) (1994). Documents that are admissible during the
PTO examination would not be admissible in these proceedings. Under 37 C.F.R. § 1.291 (1994), a
member of the public may also protest pending applications.
144. Notice of Public Hearing and Request for Comments on 18-Month Publication of Patent
Applications, 59 Fed. Reg. 63,966 (1994). Under current law, patent applications are kept
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average time to process patent applications was 19.1 months.'45 Any
additional time that the PTO will need for hearsay investigation provides
an opportunity for third parties to learn about and challenge the software
patents. This procedure, as well as re-examination, will encourage third
parties to voluntarily contribute information regarding a challenged
patent's validity rather than "stonewalling" an inquiring applicant.
Under these circumstances, there is little need to impose the
investigative burden on the applicant because third parties can be
expected to come forward and have a greater involvement in a patent's
prosecution.
Finally, the PTO is expanding its resources and therefore may be able
to accommodate its burden of proof more easily. The use of prior-art
databases is increasing, and their content is becoming more
comprehensive. This advancement will provide the PTO with an
expeditious method to find evidence to investigate hearsay. Recently,
the PTO has begun to hire examiners with computer science
backgrounds, as opposed to its previous policy of hiring only
engineers.'46 The PTO also has instituted extensive training programs for
its examiners. Thus, the PTO has improved the efficiency and accuracy
of its prior-art research and evaluation. Examiners will be more familiar
with software and better able to combine their background with the
resources of the PTO to make reasoned decisions on the credibility of
hearsay. These examiners can recognize unreliable data. and also identify
broad patent claims which will require applicants to bear the burden of
investigating hearsay.
The PTO's current lack of resources necessarily implies that a more
stringent duty of disclosure be enforced. Applicants should be
encouraged to disclose material hearsay evidence during the application
process so as to avoid the time-consuming burden on the PTO to
substantiate hearsay. The duty of disclosure should also be strictly
enforced when applicants are requested to investigate hearsay.
Applicants' good-faith effort to rebut hearsay should be recognized if
they have difficulty locating hearsay declaran:s. Under such
circumstances, these applicants should be granted their patents.
However, a deficient effort to rebut hearsay, combined with a claim that
a good-faith effort was put forth, should be grounds for discipline for
confidential until a patent is issued. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1988). Pending and rejected applications are
not made public. Id; 37 C.F.R. § 1.14(a) (1994).
145. 1992 Ann. Rep., supra note 43, at 25.
146. Sabra Chartrand, Patents, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1994, at A36. Sec also 1992 Ann. Rep.,
supra note 43, at 1 (reporting that 1941 examiners are employed by the PTO).
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inequitable conduct. This stringent enforcement of the duty of disclosure
will ensure that only valid patents are issued.
V. CONCLUSION
The Epstein decision opens the door to the receipt of low-quality
evidence during the patent application process. At a minimum, the
Federal Circuit should have imposed some restrictions on the
admissibility of hearsay and should have provided guidance on
evaluating its credibility and probative worth. Because the court has not
done so, the PTO should independently take this step of imposing
practical restrictions and guidelines on hearsay. By doing this, the patent
system will function smoothly and uniformly. Examiners will be able to
make sound decisions on patentability and on the appropriateness of
requiring an applicant to rebut hearsay. This will ensure that applicants
are not unfairly burdened and that abusive patent practices do not occur.

